The short version#
- Most of what sol pbc makes runs on your own hardware and never reaches us. The solstone app takes in what you share with it, and all of it goes into your journal on your device. No telemetry, no analytics, and we don't use the crash reports phones share with app developers. Details: what we hold, and where it goes
- We run four optional hosted services, and none is required. What each one can see is different, and each section says exactly what. Private network and solstone.me carry encrypted bytes they have no key to. Encrypted backup holds encrypted blocks we have no key to. With confidential processing, our own model reads what you send, in the clear, only while it answers you, and verifiably keeps none of it. Details: private network · encrypted backup · confidential processing · solstone.me
- Notifications from your journal to your phone are off until you turn them on, and the push services that carry them never see what one says. On iphone each one also passes through a hop we run, which can't read it. Details: notifications
- What we hold about you is small and named, and you can see and download most of it. For a sign-in, a subscription and each service: what its section names, never what's inside your journal. Stripe holds your card. Details: your sign-in · billing · how long we keep each record
- You can close your sign-in yourself, which ends every service tied to it, with 72 hours to change your mind; the sign-in and service records this page names are gone from sol pbc's active systems within a week after that. A few things outlast it, and we name each one. Details: your rights
- We never sell, license, sublicense, or lease your data, and we never use it for advertising or profiling. That isn't a policy. It's Article 8 of sol pbc's articles of incorporation, and it can't be amended without the founder's personal signature; after him, the language can only get stronger. Details: what sol pbc will never do
- Three companies provide the infrastructure and payments behind the hosted services and your sign-in, and one more runs our mailbox. Cloudflare, Microsoft Azure and Stripe, each named with what it sees. Google runs the mailbox where mail to our support addresses and what you send through the contact form land. None of them is given a readable byte of your journal. Details: who processes data for us
- If you write to us, or we look up your sign-in or your billing, an AI agent on an outside provider's models reads it, and a person here may too. Details: writing to us
- When this policy changes, we say what changed, here and in the changelog. Details: changes to this policy
How to read this page#
The short version is a summary; the sections below carry the specifics, service by service. This page is the one home for what sol pbc holds; the services terms are the one home for what each service does, and for paying, canceling and refunds. If the short version and a section ever seem to disagree, the section governs; tell us at support@solstone.app and we'll fix the summary. The covenants are the authority over all of it: this policy describes them in plain language, and if it ever conflicts with the articles of incorporation or the bylaws, they govern.
Contents
- The short version · who we are · what sol pbc makes
- What we hold, and where it goes: local use · the phone and watch apps · the solstone extension · your sign-in · private network · encrypted backup · confidential processing · solstone.me · notifications · scout · billing · writing to us · solpbc.org · children
- What sol pbc will never do · who processes data for us · your rights, and how to see, export and delete · how long we keep each record
- vit and AT Protocol · solstone and recording laws · changes to this policy · recent changes · changelog
Who we are#
We are sol pbc, a Colorado public benefit corporation. Our benefit purpose, as filed with the Colorado Secretary of State, is to advance digital self-determination by providing open-source, privacy-respecting tools and services that enable individuals to directly collect and gain insight from their personal data.
We have one director: jeremie miller, the founder. What happens to your data if control of sol pbc ever changes is set out in our articles of incorporation, and what sol pbc will never do says how.
Contact: contact us. For the hosted services specifically, support@solstone.app.
What sol pbc makes#
We develop two open source projects:
- solstone: the solstone app takes in what you share with it, and all of it goes into your journal: an open source, local-first memory the agents you use can work from. What you share is turned, locally by default and with AI, into a searchable knowledge graph of your digital life. It runs on your hardware.
- vit: a developer capability network built on AT Protocol. Developers and AI agents discover, share, and remix software capabilities through a decentralized social network.
We also operate four optional hosted services: private network, encrypted backup, confidential processing and solstone.me. Each is a convenience, never a requirement, and each has a way to do the same thing with sol pbc out of the path. What the solstone app takes in reaches sol pbc only through one of these, when you turn it on.
What we hold, and where it goes#
From local use of solstone and vit: almost nothing#
Both solstone and vit are open source software that runs on your hardware. We receive no data merely from your local use of these products: no telemetry, no analytics, no usage data. If your phone shares crash reports with app developers, we don't use them. The source code is public, so you can verify this yourself.
The solstone software works offline from sol pbc, except that it reaches updates.solstone.app to fetch its own runtimes, models and tools, and to check for newer versions. That leaves the same edge logs as visiting solpbc.org. (Older versions fetch some of their tools from GitHub or the tools' own sites, which see your network address the way any website does.) vit reaches sol pbc only when you ask it to, when its explore and inbox commands ask the index vit and AT Protocol describes. Applying for or receiving scout status, or a hosted service you turn on, whether you pay for it or receive it complimentary, adds the records its own section names.
From the solstone apps on your phone and watch: what they reach for, and where it goes#
These apps run on your own hardware, and nothing they take in comes to sol pbc on its own. They do ask your permission to reach parts of your device, each for a source you turn on yourself, and what each source takes in goes into your journal:
- audio, through your microphone, while an audio source, a meeting or a voice memo you started is running;
- photos and video: still photos from your camera while the camera source is on, photos you choose to import from your photo library, and video of your screen while the screen source is on, including what other apps show;
- your location, so a memory has a place attached to it: on android, approximate location only, never precise; on iphone, precise unless you choose approximate;
- calendar events, from the calendars you include, while the calendar source is on, back as far as you choose;
- things you share into the app from other apps.
The camera also scans your journal's pairing code, and on iphone that is all it does. On iphone the app also asks to reach devices on your local network, so it can connect straight to your journal on the same wifi. The audio, location and screen sources can keep running in the background where your device allows it. On apple watch, the microphone and location run only while something you started on the watch is running, and what they take in waits on the watch until it can reach your iphone, and from there your journal. Every permission can be turned off in your device's settings at any time, and a source that loses one stops taking in what it needed. The apps also ask whether they may send you notifications, which notifications covers. On iphone and ipad the app can carry the solstone extension for Safari, which its section covers.
Where it goes: into your journal. What these apps take in stays on the device until you connect a journal, and then travels to that journal on your own machine. It reaches sol pbc only through a hosted service you turn on, each described in its own section below. On iphone, notifications from your journal, if you turn them on, pass through a hop sol pbc runs that can't read them. We run no analytics inside these apps and collect nothing from them, and we never sell, license, sublicense or lease what they take in, or profile you with it or use it for advertising: those are covenants in our articles of incorporation. We also do not train anything on it, which is a commitment we make and hold ourselves to, reinforced by those covenants rather than written as one of them.
From the solstone extension in your browser: what it reads, and where it goes#
The solstone extension works with the solstone app on the same device, and only together with it: what it takes in goes into your journal through the solstone app, and nothing it reads comes to sol pbc on its own.
What it reads. When you first install it, it can read no website's pages. Your browser's permission decides which sites it reads. Allowing a site in your browser adds it, and if your browser allows the extension on every website, it reads every website, including ones you visit later. In some browsers it also asks you to agree, in the extension, before it reads anything that agreement covers. A site you leave out isn't read, whatever your browser allows. An update never widens what it reads by itself. A site you add or leave out, such as bank.com, can cover every address under it. It goes by the site each part of a page comes from, so it reads a site it covers even inside another page, and doesn't read a site you left out even inside a page it reads. When you open it, it looks at the address of the tab you're on, so it can show whether it reads that site, and that stays in your browser.
On a site it reads, whenever a tab on it is open, background tabs included, it takes in the page's text and rough layout, including text you'd see by scrolling and text the page has but doesn't show you, each time the page changes; the page's address, without anything after a ? or #, its title, when it read it and the sites its links point to; and facts about the tab and your browser, such as whether the tab was in front. On a mail or chat site it reads, that includes your messages, and on any site it can include words you've typed but haven't sent, and anything a site shows, even something you'd consider secret. What you type into a site's own editor, such as a message or a document, is part of the page's text. It never takes pixels or raw HTML, never reads what you type into a form field such as a password box, never records clicks, scrolling or keystrokes, and takes in nothing from private windows or private browsing.
Where it goes: into your journal, through the solstone app. Nothing leaves your browser except to the solstone app on the same device, over the connection your browser provides between an extension and an app. The extension itself connects to nothing on the internet except through your browser's own update check, or, inside the solstone app, by updating with the app. If the solstone app isn't paired or isn't taking in browser pages, the extension stops taking in new pages once it next checks with the app; until then it can still take them in, and they wait in the extension. On a computer, the solstone app also has to be running. On iphone and ipad, the extension keeps taking in the sites you've chosen while the solstone app is in the background or closed, and what it takes in waits on the device until the app next runs. From there it reaches sol pbc only the way everything else the solstone app takes in does: through a hosted service you turn on. We run no analytics in the extension and collect nothing from it.
What stays in your browser, and how to clear it. The extension keeps a little in your browser's own storage: your choices and agreements, including the sites you've added or left out; notes it shows you about particular sites; what it needs while a tab is open, such as the last copy of a page, so it sends only what changes; a random identifier for this browser profile, which goes into your journal with each page so it can tell your browsers apart, and nowhere else; and pages the solstone app hasn't accepted yet, which go to whichever journal the solstone app is paired with when it can, and stay until the app takes them or turns them away for good, or you remove the extension, or clear it in Safari as below. Once the app has accepted a page, it keeps it on the same device until your journal has it. If you pair the solstone app with a different journal, what it's still holding goes into that journal once you confirm it's the journal you meant, or choose to go on when the app can't tell. Unpairing or pairing again doesn't delete it, and you can discard it yourself, on iphone and ipad by removing the solstone app.
Pausing the extension stops it reading, and on a computer, pausing the solstone app stops it too, unless you turn that off in the extension's settings. Removing a site or leaving it out stops anything new from it. Either way, what's already taken in still goes into your journal and stays there until you delete it. Removing the extension removes what it kept in your browser. In Safari, where the extension comes inside the solstone app, removing the app doesn't remove what the extension kept, and Safari may keep the sites you allowed it, so they can apply again if you reinstall. To clear it, choose Clear Storage for the solstone extension in Safari's extension settings, in each Safari profile you use it in, then keep Safari open with the extension on for a few minutes while it removes the rest; do that before you remove the app.
Chrome Web Store Limited Use. The solstone extension's use and transfer of information it takes in complies with the Chrome Web Store User Data Policy, including the Limited Use requirements. We hold ourselves to more than that policy asks: it lets a developer transfer user data in a merger, acquisition or sale of assets with the user's consent, and our articles of incorporation do not let us rely on that. Selling it is barred outright, consent or no consent. No merger, acquisition, or asset sale may be used to route around these protections, and any successor must take on the protections what sol pbc will never do describes. (Articles of Incorporation, Sections 8.3(a)(1), 8.3(c), and 8.5.)
From your sign-in at services.solstone.app#
The solstone app has no sign-in of its own. You sign in at services.solstone.app only to turn hosted services on and off, see what we hold about you, manage billing, and ask us for help; your journal and your devices work without it. You sign in with your email (we email you a code) or with a passkey your own device holds. The sign-in form runs Cloudflare's bot check in your browser, and we pass Cloudflare the network address you came from along with that check.
What we keep. The email addresses you've added (the primary one is the one we write to); the passkeys you've registered (the public half of each, a name, what kind of device made it, and when it was made and last used); your sessions (the browser's identifying string, shown to you as a device label, the network address it connected from, held encrypted and shown to you shortened, and when it started and was last used); when your sign-in was created and last used; one-way fingerprints of the codes we email you, with the address each went to; and one-way keyed counts of sign-in and services portal actions, per network address, email address and sign-in, to stop abuse. A session lasts up to two weeks unless you sign out or end it from the services portal. A passkey you remove is kept, marked removed. From a device-registration flow no app uses today, we also keep a one-way fingerprint of each credential it issued, and when. How long each of these is kept is in the retention table.
If we ever need to see your services as you see them, an operator can open a one-hour session on your sign-in; it shows in your session list like any other, and you can end it there. When we look up a sign-in to answer you or to keep the services secure, the AI agent that helps us, on an outside provider's models as writing to us describes, sees what we look up, and our own working records of that may name your email. Each hosted service you turn on adds the records its section names.
All of it is Customer Data under our covenants (the Article 8 term, defined in what sol pbc will never do): we use it only to run your sign-in, and we never sell it, profile you with it, or use it for advertising. You can see your emails, passkeys and sessions at services.solstone.app/transparency.
The request trace. Every request the services portal's code answers, the notification hop for iphone included, and each scheduled job it runs, leaves a trace in our own storage, which deletes it after 90 days, apart from the older traces below. A trace says when the request or job ran and how it went, and it never holds a network address. Some carry more, alone or together: a one-way reference to your sign-in, to one of its records or to a journal; the service and details of the event, such as a renewal date or an error code from Stripe; or, when something fails unexpectedly, the error it raised, which can name one of your records. Traces written through September 23, 2026 also record which page each request asked for; one of them names a support request by its number, and all of them are gone by December 23, 2026. The trace is Customer Data: we use it only to operate and secure the services portal, and never sell it, profile you with it, or use it for advertising. It isn't on the transparency page or in your download, and it outlasts a deletion of your sign-in, on the schedule above.
From private network (the relay): a record of your journal, connection metadata, never content#
What it is. A relay sol pbc runs so you can reach your own journal from your phone, or any of your devices, from anywhere. Without it, your devices connect directly on your own network, or you can bring your own transport, both private by the same construction.
Blind by construction. Your devices open an encrypted tunnel to each other, end to end, and the relay passes the encrypted bytes between them. It holds no key to them and keeps no copy of what flows through, so neither the relay nor sol pbc can read anything inside the tunnel. That's how the relay is built, not a setting you have to trust us to honor.
What it keeps. A record of each journal you connect to it: what identifies it, including the public key we check its pairings against; the state of its credential, including when it enrolled and whether it has been revoked; and whether its subscription is live, plus any subscription grant waiting for a journal to enroll, until it does or you delete it. At services.solstone.app we also keep which journal you turned the relay on for and when you last did, and the short-lived record the turn-on page leaves so your journal can collect its go-ahead. It keeps no record of your devices. A device you pair holds its own credential, and the relay checks it each time and keeps nothing about the device that presented it, so there is no list of your devices to keep, hand over, or lose. Until September 2026 the relay did keep a per-device record; those records were dropped with the table that held them. How long each is kept is in the retention table.
Connection metadata. To move your bytes, the relay and Cloudflare, whose network it runs on, necessarily handle your devices' network addresses, connection timing and how much data moved. The relay keeps no connection log of its own; what Cloudflare retains is described in the Cloudflare privacy policy. It can reveal that a device connected, never what it said.
All of it is Customer Data under our covenants: we use it only to operate and secure the relay, and never sell it, profile you with it, or use it for advertising. It is processed by Cloudflare (the network and the database) and Stripe (payments), never your content. When you stop paying, the relay stops at the end of the period you paid for and nothing of yours is lost; the services terms say exactly what happens. Closing your sign-in deletes the relay's record of your journal and any pending grant; canceling your subscription stops the relay and never touches your journal.
If we're compelled. What we could produce is your sign-in and billing record, the access records and the relay's record of your journal above, and the request trace. The relay keeps no log of connection metadata, so a demand could reach only whatever Cloudflare's network still retains. Never a list of the devices you paired, because we keep none. Never the contents, because there is no key and no plaintext to give. We resist such demands to the maximum the law allows and notify you when we legally can.
From the operated tier of encrypted backup: encrypted blocks and storage metadata, never content#
What it is. Storage sol pbc runs so an encrypted copy of your journal can live somewhere other than your own machine. Pointing encrypted backup at your own object-storage bucket instead is always available, with the same code, encryption and recovery.
Encrypted by construction. Before anything leaves your device, solstone encrypts the contents, the file names and the folder structure, and those encrypted blocks land in storage sol pbc runs for you. We cannot read them: we hold no key, no password, and no way to decrypt them, and a backup is restored only with your recovery key, which we never have. Nothing readable from your journal reaches this storage or our storage provider.
What it keeps. Operational information about your stored blocks (how many encrypted objects there are, how much space they take, and when they last changed); a log of each time your journal was issued a storage credential, or refused one, and when; and a record of each cleanup we ran on your stored blocks. At services.solstone.app we also keep which journal you turned it on for and when you last did, a fingerprint of its current credential and, if it lapsed, when, a fingerprint of each credential we retired, and the short-lived record the turn-on page leaves so your journal can collect its credential. To move your blocks, the storage (Cloudflare R2) and Cloudflare necessarily handle connection metadata about your device's upload sessions: its network address, connection timing, and how much data moved. None of it includes the contents of your journal. How long each is kept is in the retention table. All of it is Customer Data: we use it only to operate and secure the storage, and never sell it, profile you with it, or use it for advertising. It is processed by Cloudflare and Stripe (payments); what Cloudflare does with what it sees is in the Cloudflare privacy policy.
After you stop paying. When your subscription lapses, whether you cancel or a renewal fails, we keep your encrypted blocks for 30 days after the period you paid for ends, then permanently delete them. Once deleted, we cannot recover them. This only ever affects the copy in our storage, never your journal on your own devices or a backup in your own bucket. The services terms set out the full sequence, including subscribing again within the 30 days.
How to delete it. You can delete your backup from the backup screen in your journal at any time. Closing your sign-in deletes the operated copy with no 30-day window, along with the credential log and cleanup records.
If we're compelled. What we could produce is your sign-in and billing record, encrypted blocks we can't read, the operational information, access records, credential log and cleanup records above, the connection metadata of your upload sessions, and the request trace. Never the contents, because there is no key and no plaintext to give. We resist such demands to the maximum the law allows and notify you when we legally can.
From confidential processing: what you send the model, retained by nobody#
Confidential processing is off until you turn it on, and turning it off sends new work back to your own machine; work already under way finishes where it started.
What it is. An AI model sol pbc runs on confidential GPU hardware, so your journal can think with more capacity than your own machine has. Instead, you can always run a model on your own hardware, or bring your own provider key or endpoint, and sol pbc is not in the path at all.
What leaves your device. The text and images your journal needs a model to work through, and, if the audio switch is on, your audio for transcription. That switch is on by default while confidential processing is in use, and it is yours to change: turn it off and speech becomes text on your own device instead, once any transcription already under way finishes. Your journal itself never leaves.
We run the model, and it reads what you send. The model is ours, our own weights and serving stack, on hardware sol pbc operates. No third-party AI provider is in the path. Unlike our other services, this one isn't closed to us by a key we never hold: our own model reads what you send, in the clear, while it answers you, from inside the confidential container. What protects it is the published build that booted. Before your journal sends anything, it verifies the machine, every time: the hardware's own attestation, the GPU's own evidence, and a fingerprint of the exact software that booted, which is pinned in solstone's open source code, so your journal trusts only the build it names. If any of it fails, it sends nothing, tells you plainly, and never falls back to another service. The check also needs NVIDIA to confirm the GPU's certificates are still good: either your journal asks NVIDIA itself, which shows NVIDIA your network address, or our machine passes your journal NVIDIA's signed answer; either way, NVIDIA sees which certificates were checked and nothing you send. (Older versions also ask NVIDIA for the GPU's reference measurements.) The records of its published builds are at trust.solstone.app.
What we commit to is what becomes of it: the service keeps nothing. No content is kept, not even in logs. No human reviews it. Nothing is used to train anything. That is a commitment we make, not something the attestation proves on its own; the image that implements it is published for anyone to audit, and your journal checks that the published image is the one running. Together, those are what make the commitment verifiable.
The hardware is Microsoft Azure's, and Azure is excluded from what runs on it. The machine is a confidential GPU instance in Azure. The hardware boundary, not configuration or promise, keeps the host out of what is being processed, memory included. Microsoft is not a party to your content.
What we keep. Nothing from what you send. We keep no connection metadata for this service, beyond the request trace, which for a credential check names no journal or sign-in; the network the machine sits on handles the connection, and Azure's row in the processor table says what it sees. Inside the confidential container, the service counts how much it has done for a journal, to manage capacity, and notes that a channel was admitted or refused; neither is tied to who you are outside that boundary, and the count never leaves the container. Outside it, we keep only three records about access, never content, all deleted with your sign-in:
- your access, tying your sign-in to that journal: when you turned the service on and last confirmed it, a fingerprint of its current credential, and the version of the disclosure you acknowledged;
- a log of each time your journal was issued a credential, or refused one, and when;
- the short-lived turn-on record your journal collects its credential from, holding, encrypted, that credential, the service's address and the model's name, and your sign-in and journal identifiers; or, if you turn it on without a subscription, what your journal needs to finish once you subscribe; or, if your subscription already covers another journal, a link to subscribe.
They tell us that you consented and when your journal was issued or refused a credential, never what you sent or how much you used. All three are Customer Data: we use them only to run and control access to the service, and never sell them, profile you with them, or use them for advertising.
The container sends the rest of our systems two things. The first is your credential, shown to the services portal when a channel opens, so the services portal can answer whether it is still good; your journal can also ask that itself, at most once a minute while its thinking app is open with confidential processing on, from your journal's network address, which Cloudflare sees. Outside the container we write nothing down about either check beyond the request trace and the short-lived request logs our providers keep. The second is a fixed-form report on the machine's own health, sent to our monitoring on Cloudflare: whether its parts are running, fixed error codes, and totals for all journals together and a monthly spread of how much journals used, never broken out by journal. It names no journal or sign-in and holds nothing you sent; its figures are Customer Data, used only to run the service.
Who processes it. We do, and Microsoft Azure hosts the machine, excluded by its hardware from what it processes. Cloudflare runs the services portal that checks a credential, the database that holds the access records, and our monitoring. Stripe, where the access is paid. Access is complimentary through the scout program or by subscription; when it ends, processing returns to your own machine and nothing is lost, because nothing was stored. The services terms say when that happens.
How to see, export and delete. Nothing you send is retained, so there is nothing of it to export or delete. Your access and the log are in your download; the short-lived turn-on record is not, and the download says so.
If we're compelled. There is no retained content to compel. What a demand could reach is your sign-in and billing record, the three access records, the request trace, and whatever Azure's network still retains of the connection. We resist such demands to the maximum the law allows and notify you when we legally can.
From solstone.me: an address for your journal, connection metadata, never content#
What it is. An address on the internet for your journal, so an agent you already use can read from it. You turn it on, connect an agent, and choose what that agent may see; your journal enforces that choice on your own device. Instead, your own domain, with a tunnel that only passes the bytes through, works with nothing of ours in the path.
Blind by construction. Your own machine holds the certificate's private key and ends the encryption, so the relay we run in between passes bytes it has no key to and cannot read. It keeps no database, no file, and no lasting record of what passes through it; what it writes down about its own health says that something happened, never who it happened to.
What this doesn't protect against. Whoever controls the solstone.me name (today, sol pbc and Cloudflare, which registers it and answers its lookups for us) could in principle get a certificate of their own for your address, and with it read what your agent reads, and reuse your agent's key to reach your journal as though they were your agent. We don't. A new certificate would normally show in public certificate logs, but a certificate authority can issue one without logging it, and the software agents connect with usually doesn't insist that it was logged. Until November 30, 2026, Cloudflare also holds older certificates that cover every solstone.me address, and using one of those wouldn't show in the logs at all. If you'd rather not rely on any of that, use your own domain with a tunnel that only passes the bytes through. One warning: some free tunnels decrypt your traffic in order to move it, and whoever runs one can read what your agent reads and reuse its key the same way. If a tunnel's documentation doesn't say it only passes the bytes through, assume it ends the encryption.
Your address. Eight random characters, followed by solstone.me, made from nothing of yours. So that an agent can trust it, your journal gets a standard certificate for it, and like every certificate behind a secure website, it is listed in public certificate logs that nobody can edit. So the fact that your address exists stays public for good, including after you turn the service off, cancel, or close your sign-in. Your address is never reassigned to anyone else.
What we keep. Three lasting records, at services.solstone.app, all Customer Data:
- the address binding: which address belongs to which journal on your sign-in, and when it was made;
- the turn-on record: which journal you turned it on for, that you confirmed the turn-on screen, which version, and when you first and last did, kept from the moment you press the button whether or not you subscribe, so you are not asked again;
- the address reservation: the address and when it was reserved, and nothing else. No name, no sign-in, no journal attached to it.
The first two are deleted with your sign-in. The third is not, and that is deliberate: it is how we make sure your old address is never issued to someone else, and once your sign-in is deleted nothing in it points back to you. The turn-on page also leaves a short-lived record so your journal can learn whether it may connect yet. How long each is kept is in the retention table.
What we do not keep. Your journal asks us for a short-lived pass whenever it needs one, and we keep no log of those passes, beyond the request trace, which ties no pass to you, and the short-lived request logs our providers keep. sol pbc holds no readable record of what any agent asked your journal for, what it was shown, or what it was refused. Your journal keeps that record on your device for you; we never receive it in a form we can read; if you use the operated backup, it sits inside the encrypted copy of your journal, which we have no key to.
Connection metadata. To carry your traffic, the relay and Microsoft Azure, whose machine it runs on, necessarily handle the network addresses your journal and the agent reached it from, that they met, when, and how much moved. We see that, and never what they said. The relay keeps no lasting record of it; what Azure's network retains is Azure's, under the Microsoft privacy statement. Cloudflare runs the control plane that mints your address and issues those passes, so it sees the network address your journal asks from, and it answers the lookups for solstone.me, so it sees that your address was asked for, when, and the address that asked, usually your agent's internet provider rather than the agent itself.
The agent is yours, and its maker is not our processor. The agents you connect are run by other companies, or by you. Whoever runs one learns your address and gets what it reads, on their own terms. We are not a party to that, this policy does not describe it, and our covenants do not bind them.
Who processes it, and when you stop paying. Microsoft Azure (the relay's machine), Cloudflare (the control plane, the database holding the records above, and the address lookup) and Stripe (payments), each given no readable byte of your journal. When you stop paying, the relay stops carrying your traffic at the end of the period you paid for, and your address stays reserved for you: subscribing again brings back the same one.
How to see, export and delete. The address binding and the turn-on record are in your download, which names the reservation as a record we keep. Closing your sign-in deletes the binding and the turn-on record, but not the reservation or the public certificate listings, which nobody can edit.
If we're compelled. What we could produce is your sign-in and billing record, the records above, the request trace, and whatever Azure's network and Cloudflare still retain of the connection and lookup metadata. Never what an agent asked for or was shown, and never the contents, because we have no readable copy and no key. We resist such demands to the maximum the law allows and notify you when we legally can.
From notifications: never what one says#
Notifications are built into the solstone app, free, with no sign-in needed. One the app raises and shows on the same device never leaves it.
Notifications from your journal to your phone are off until you turn them on, phone by phone. When you do, the phone makes its own key and hands it to your journal over the connection they paired on, and your journal locks every notification with that key before it leaves your machine. Only that phone and your journal can read what a notification says, and every one is padded to the same size, so its length says nothing either. Unpairing the phone stops your journal sending to it at once; turning them off on the phone does so once the phone next reaches your journal.
A phone away from home is reached through its push service, which holds a locked notification until it can deliver it, and never sees what one says. It sees the delivery details, such as which phone and when, and on android the network address of the machine your journal runs on. On iphone, your journal sends through a hop sol pbc runs on Cloudflare's network, which hands it to Apple. The hop handles your journal's id, your phone's push token and the locked notification only to pass it on, and keeps no record of your phone, your journal, or what a notification says: what stays behind is a trace of each request, with no address or identifier in it. Cloudflare, whose network the hop runs on, handles the connection and everything passing through the hop. Apple sees a fixed title and line, the same for everyone, that your phone shows if it can't unlock one. On android, your journal sends straight to your phone's push service, and sol pbc isn't in the path. Push services aren't our processors: they're the services phones use, under their own terms. Once a notification is on your phone, the phone shows it the way your notification settings say, lock screen included.
From applying for or receiving scout status: application and status history, never your journal#
Scout is a status on an owner sign-in. Approval enables complimentary access to eligible services; paid access is independent. If you apply for or receive it, we keep the application text you submit, that and when you acknowledged the disclosure, the current status and its timestamps, and a forward-only history of real status changes.
Each history event says what changed and when, with a standard reason, and who or what made the change: you, a named operator, or an authenticated automated service. Events are append-only: we do not edit or selectively delete them. The history began when the feature launched, in July 2026. It holds no journal content, application text, customer email, credential, network address, browser details, billing identifier or key material; an operator's email may appear only to identify that operator, and an automated service is never presented as identifying a human.
We use it only to administer and secure scout status, give it to you, and resolve problems with your status, and never for analytics, aggregate reporting, advertising, profiling, behavioral measurement or model training. It is deleted with your sign-in, and it is in your download; ask for a correction at support@solstone.app. Our own notes on your application, which may quote it, stay in our records, and a copy can outlast the deletion in a form only we can reach.
From subscribing (billing): the minimum to bill you#
If you subscribe to a hosted service, we keep the minimum needed to run your subscription: your email address, your subscription status and renewal dates, a reference tying it to your sign-in, when you asked us to start a service right away, if you did, a record of any withdrawal you made at services.solstone.app (which subscription and service, and its dates), and a copy of each confirmation, renewal reminder and other notice we email you as a subscriber, with when we sent it; of a withdrawal's acknowledgement we keep only when we sent it. The copies and the withdrawal record are in your download, and, apart from a start-now request whose checkout never finished, which goes after two days, all of it is kept until your sign-in is deleted.
Stripe is our payment processor. Your card and payment details go directly to Stripe, under Stripe's terms and privacy policy. We never see or store your card number. Stripe holds the card, the name on it and the billing address. We have read-only access to what Stripe holds about your payments, such as the card's brand, last four digits and expiry, the name, the address and each charge, and an operator, or the AI agent that helps us on an outside provider's models, uses it to run your subscription, answer your billing questions and keep our books; our own working records of a look-up may keep what it showed. We send Stripe only what it needs to charge you and tie the charge back to you: the email on your sign-in, a reference to your sign-in, the service you chose, and the transaction itself. The services portal and the hosted services never ask Stripe for your card's details, and keep none of them. From what Stripe sends back, we keep that a payment succeeded or failed, when it renews, and Stripe's own numbers for you and your subscription. We never send Stripe anything from your journal. At checkout, Stripe may offer to save your details to Link, its own wallet, and that option may already be selected; Link is Stripe's, under Stripe's terms, and we keep nothing you give it.
We use your billing details only to run your subscription and keep our books, and never sell them, share them for anyone else's purposes, or use them for advertising, profiling or any other purpose; Stripe's own uses of what we send it are under who processes data for us. Closing your sign-in deletes your customer record at Stripe: the card goes and any subscription is canceled. The transaction records outlast it, as the retention table says.
From writing to us: what you send us#
The support form. Anyone can ask for help at support.solstone.app without signing in. We receive the subject, the details, which product you picked, and, if you fill them in, your versions and your email. A report you start from inside a solstone app fills some of it in for you, such as the versions and system you run, the diagnostic lines it shows you, and facts about the error, and you see and can change all of it before you send. We give you a reference number. Cloudflare runs the form's bot check, network and database; we pass it the address your request came from with that check, and keep no record of it ourselves. When a request closes, what you sent is deleted, leaving a marker with its reference number, how it closed and its dates, a one-way fingerprint that stops a retry being filed twice, and, if we closed it, who did and in what state. Through August 7, 2026, our systems also wrote their own record of each request as it arrived, which keeps the subject and who sent it, and whose history can hold what you wrote, so those can outlast the deletion in a form only we can reach. Requests you make signed in, at services.solstone.app/support, carry the same, plus your verified email and any files you attach, which we keep only until we've read them, with a short note of what each held until the request closes; all of it is deleted with your sign-in.
The contact form on solpbc.org. What you write, your name and your email reach us so we can answer you, and an outside AI service screens the message on the way in. The form runs Cloudflare's bot check, and we keep no record of the address it was sent from. What you wrote lands in our mailbox, which Google runs for us, and stays there until you ask us to delete it. The record our systems write about its arrival keeps your name, your email, when you wrote, a pointer to the message and how our check rated it, not the message itself; through September 26, 2026 it kept what you wrote as well. That record keeps a history, so it can outlast a deletion in a form only we can reach.
Email. Mail to support@solstone.app, our older support@solpbc.org, or a reply to something we sent you, lands in a mailbox Google runs for us and stays there until we delete it; ask from that address and we will. We use it to respond to you, and never add you to mailing lists, share your email for anyone else's purposes, or use it for marketing.
Elsewhere. If you ask for help on GitHub or Bluesky, we read it there.
Whichever way you write, an AI agent reads what you send and drafts our answer, and a person here may read it too; the AI tools we work with run on an outside provider's models. Our own notes on it, which may quote what you sent, stay in our records, and so, for email, do the sender, the recipients, when it arrived and how our check rated it, on the same terms as the contact form; through September 26, 2026 those records also kept each email's subject, its opening lines and the check's summary of it. So send what helps and nothing more. We never train a model on what you send us.
From solpbc.org and the sites listed here: almost nothing#
When you visit solpbc.org, v-it.org, solstone.app, go.solstone.app, trust.solstone.app, transparency.solstone.app or explore.v-it.org, or solstone reaches updates.solstone.app, our hosting provider, Cloudflare, collects standard edge server logs (IP address, pages visited, browser type, timestamp), as the Cloudflare privacy policy describes under "end users." We read only aggregate counts of requests and errors from them, by site or service, to keep the sites up, and never anything about a visitor. We don't use Google Analytics, tracking pixels, cookies, or any other tracking technology on any of these sites; the contact form's bot check and the video player on our talks page run in Cloudflare's own frames, under its privacy policy. A pairing link opens at go.solstone.app when no solstone app on your device catches it, and always on a computer, and its pairing secret sits in the part of the link that never reaches a server.
From children: nothing, and we don't want it#
Our services aren't directed to children under 13, and we don't knowingly collect their data. If you believe a child's data has reached us, email support@solstone.app and we'll delete it.
What sol pbc will never do#
These aren't policies. They're binding covenants in our articles of incorporation and bylaws. While the founder serves as a director, any amendment to Article 8 requires his personal written consent (a right that cannot be delegated). After he ceases to serve, Article 8 can only be amended to strengthen these protections. (Articles of Incorporation, Article 8, Section 8.6.) The bylaws sit under Article 8 and cannot be used to narrow it. (Bylaws, Article VI.)
Throughout this policy, your data means what Article 8 defines as Customer Data: any data, information, content, record, output, or inference concerning you or derived from such data, including de-identified, anonymized, aggregated, pseudonymized, or encrypted forms. Connection metadata, billing records, and every access record named above are all Customer Data, and the covenants reach every one of them.
- Never sell, license, sublicense, or lease your data, including anonymized, aggregated, or de-identified data. (Articles of Incorporation, Article 8, Section 8.3(a)(1))
- Never use your data for advertising, profiling, or behavioral targeting: no analytics vendors, no tracking pixels, no behavioral profiles, no exceptions. (Articles, Section 8.3(b); Bylaws, Article III, Section 3.3)
- Never weaken these protections, even if acquired. Any merger, acquisition, or transfer of control is conditional, on two separate terms. Where the business continues in another entity, that entity must be a Colorado public benefit corporation or bound under its own governing law and documents to a substantially equivalent public benefit and to substantially equivalent balancing duties. Where any of your data, or a service built on it, is transferred, the recipient must assume covenants no less protective than Article 8, and where they take that on by written instrument, our shareholders and former shareholders are third-party beneficiaries of it, with direct enforcement rights that survive the transaction. (Articles, Section 8.5)
- Always maintain reasonable safeguards for your data in our hands, use the most protective architecture reasonably practicable for each system, and keep building toward architectures that remove our own access to it: encryption in transit and at rest, least-privilege access controls, and access logging, plus ongoing design toward end-to-end encryption, customer-held keys, secure enclaves, and confidential computing, which minimize and, where reasonably practicable, eliminate operator access to plaintext data. (Bylaws, Article III, Section 3.1)
- Always resist government data demands: resist disclosure to the maximum extent permitted by law, notify the affected owner if legally allowed, and pursue architectures that make compelled disclosure technically infeasible. (Bylaws, Article III, Section 3.2)
These covenants bind the company, and any successor that takes on your data must assume covenants no less protective than Article 8. They apply in full to the hosted services. The blind relays and the backup we hold no key to are these covenants made concrete. Confidential processing is the one where our own model reads what you send while it answers you, and turning it on is your own specific, informed choice; what stands in place of a key we don't hold is a published build your journal verifies before it sends.
The narrow exceptions. Your data leaves sol pbc only in the three narrow ways the covenant allows (Articles, Section 8.3(a)(2)): (1) to a service provider bound to protections no weaker than the covenant, and only as far as strictly necessary to provide, maintain, secure, or support the service you asked for; (2) at your own specific, informed direction for that particular thing, never by this policy alone or a default you didn't change, for example by choosing to pay Stripe by card; or (3) when we're compelled by law, in which case the covenant requires us to use reasonable efforts to keep it to the minimum required and to notify you unless the law forbids it, and our bylaws add that we resist such demands to the maximum the law allows. We never sell, license, sublicense, or lease your data (Articles, Section 8.3(a)(1)), and we never share it for anyone else's purposes; our processors' own uses of what they handle, Stripe's among them, are described under who processes data for us.
Who processes data for us#
We keep our processor list for the hosted services and your sign-in short, and name each one; writing to us says what else touches what you send us. Cloudflare, Microsoft Azure and Stripe are each bound by contract never to use what we send them to advertise to you, to build a profile of you as a person for us or anyone else, or to sell it; Google runs our mailbox under Google Workspace's standard terms and is not in the path of any hosted service. Like any payment or infrastructure company, each also runs its own fraud-prevention, security and service operations on the limited technical data it handles; for Stripe that means scoring the payment, and Stripe's own terms let it analyze what it holds about you, the email and transaction details we send included, to improve and develop Stripe's products. That is why we send each one only what it needs. None of them is given a readable byte of your journal. The AI agent that helps us when you write to us, or when we look up a sign-in or billing record, runs on an outside provider's models.
| Provider | What they do for us | What they can see |
|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare | Hosts our websites and updates.solstone.app, the services portal and its sign-in check; runs the networks the private network relay and the notification hop for iphone run on; runs the databases and storage behind the services portal, the relay, solstone.me, the support form, the request trace and the index of public vit records, the storage for the operated backup (Cloudflare R2), solstone.me's control plane and address lookup, and the monitoring that receives confidential processing's health report; delivers the emails we send you and our replies to the support form; and carries mail sent to support@solstone.app on its way to our mailbox | Standard edge logs for the sites; the public vit records and handles the explore.v-it.org index holds; connection metadata and the encrypted bytes for the relay; at the notification hop, connection metadata and what passes through it (your journal's id, your phone's push token and the locked notification), never what a notification says; the encrypted blocks and connection metadata for the backup, with its operational information, credential log and cleanup records; the records each section of this page names as held at services.solstone.app or by the relay, solstone.me or the support form; the request trace; confidential processing's health report, which names no journal or sign-in, and your journal's network address when it checks a credential; the network address you sign in or send a form from, with its bot check; what you send through the support and contact forms, on its own schedule (the contact form's own copy for up to a day); for solstone.me, the lookups and pass requests, never the traffic itself; and what we email you and the mail you send us, in transit. Never a readable byte of your journal |
| Microsoft Azure | Hosts the confidential GPU machine confidential processing runs on, and the ordinary machine the solstone.me relay runs on | Operational facts about each machine (that it exists, its size, when it runs), and, because connections reach each machine through Azure's network, the address a connection came from, when, and how much data moved. The confidential machine's hardware boundary excludes Azure from what it processes, memory included; on the solstone.me relay, what keeps Azure out is that the bytes are encrypted to a key only your own machine holds |
| Stripe | Payment processing for the hosted subscriptions | Your card and payment details, which you give Stripe directly, the minimal billing details we send it, and what its own checkout page collects from your browser. Never anything from your journal |
| Runs the mailbox where mail to our support addresses, contact-form messages and our replies to your email land, under Google Workspace's standard terms | That mail and those messages. Nothing else as our processor |
If we ever add or change a processor, we'll update this list and the changelog.
Your rights, and how to see, export and delete#
You have rights over your data, and we extend them to everyone, regardless of where you live:
- Access: ask us what personal data we have about you
- Correction: ask us to fix inaccuracies
- Deletion: ask us to delete your data
- Portability: get a copy in a portable format
- Opt out: of sale, targeted advertising, or profiling (sol pbc does none of these, for anyone, ever)
See it. services.solstone.app/transparency shows each kind of record the download carries except support requests, with your most recent records of each; your support requests are at services.solstone.app/support.
Download it. At services.solstone.app/account/export you can download what we hold for your sign-in as one file, once you prove it's you. It covers your sign-in, your subscriptions, your scout application and history, the lasting access records each service's section names, and what the relay and the support system hold for you. It names, by kind, most of what it leaves out: your journal's contents, which stay in your journal; the backup's encrypted contents, which we can't read; your receipts and past charges, which you can download from Stripe's billing portal; support requests sent without an email address; the working records behind signing in, turning a service on and closing your sign-in; and anything a service could not answer for at that moment. Things it leaves out without naming them include the request trace and the security-event records named below. For those, or anything else, email support@solstone.app.
Close your sign-in yourself. At services.solstone.app/account/delete you can close your sign-in, which ends every service tied to it; you can't do this one service at a time. Once you prove it's you, you have 72 hours to change your mind; if you do, the request, with its dates and one-way fingerprints of the proof you gave, stays on your sign-in. If you don't, we delete your sign-in, your emails, passkeys and sessions, your subscriptions and the service records tied to them, the relay's record of your journal, your solstone.me address binding and turn-on record, your support requests, the encrypted copy in the operated backup, and your customer record at Stripe. Those records are gone from sol pbc's active systems within seven days after the 72 hours are up. We commit to that: deletion keeps retrying each part until it succeeds, and you can check where it stands at services.solstone.app/account/delete/status. It never touches your journal on your own devices, your devices themselves, or a bucket you control.
A few things outlast a deletion, and this applies wherever another section says something is deleted with your sign-in:
- Transaction records: our own copy, for the period tax and financial-records law requires (generally up to seven years); Stripe's charges and invoices, which Stripe keeps on its own clock, five years or more from the end of its relationship with us or your last transaction, whichever is later (an issued invoice, which carries your email, can't be redacted); and the fraud signals Stripe's systems derive from your payments, which Stripe keeps as long as it finds them useful and we cannot delete.
- Short-lived operating records: the request trace, until it goes; the request logs our providers keep for a short time on their own schedule; the delivery records of emails we sent you or that Cloudflare routed to support@solstone.app, kept for a period we have not been able to verify; the rolling 30-day recovery image our database provider keeps so we can undo our own mistakes, so anything deleted is gone from it 30 days later; and a hashed, unreadable record of the deletion itself, for up to a week, after which an unlinkable note that a deletion ran, with its dates and how each part went, names nothing about you.
- Records kept with no scheduled deletion date: security-event records, which carry a one-way reference to your sign-in (and, for a refused backup credential, to the journal it was for) and nothing from your journal; and a one-way keyed fingerprint of each checkout that started a subscription, with when we recorded it and nothing else attached, so that our own internal alert of a new subscription, which says only which service and when, is never raised twice.
- If you turned on solstone.me, two things that never expire: your address's reservation, with no name, sign-in or journal attached, so it can never go to anyone else; and the public certificate listings for it, in logs sol pbc does not run and cannot edit.
- What you wrote to us: mail to or from our support addresses and contact-form messages, which stay in our mailbox unless you ask us to delete them too; the support form's closed-request marker, and its fingerprint for at least 45 days; our own records of any support request sent by August 7, 2026, and of any contact-form message or email; our own notes on anything you wrote to us anywhere, or on a scout application, which name who wrote and may quote it; and our working records of any time we looked up your sign-in or your billing, which may name your email or keep what the look-up showed.
How long we keep each record. Where a record is kept until your sign-in is deleted, it goes when you close your sign-in, as above, apart from what outlasts a deletion.
| Record | Kept |
|---|---|
| Your sign-in, emails, passkeys (a removed one marked removed), your subscription and billing records, your scout records, and each service's lasting records this page names | Until your sign-in is deleted |
| A session | Up to two weeks while live; 30 days after it ends or expires |
| A sign-in that never verifies an email | 30 days |
| The fingerprint of a code we emailed you | Up to a day; for an address you add and never verify, until it is removed after 30 days |
| Abuse counts | 48 hours |
| The device-registration credential fingerprints | Until your sign-in is deleted |
| The short-lived record a turn-on page leaves for your journal | Good for five minutes, or an hour while confidential processing or private network waits for a subscription; deleted a day or two after it is used or stops being good, or with your sign-in if that comes first |
| A retired backup credential's fingerprint | A week |
| A start-now request whose checkout never finished | Two days |
| Your encrypted backup after access ends | 30 days after the paid period, or complimentary access, ends |
| The request trace | 90 days; traces written through September 23, 2026, until December 23, 2026 |
| What you send through the support form | Until the request closes; files you attach, until we've read them |
| The support form's closed-request fingerprint | At least 45 days |
| Mail and contact-form messages in our mailbox | Until you ask us to delete them |
| What you send confidential processing | Not kept |
| The records in a few things outlast a deletion | As that list says |
Everything else. For correction, or any other right, email support@solstone.app (for the services portal and hosted services) or contact us. We'll respond as fast as we can, and within the time the law requires: 45 days under the Colorado Privacy Act, one month under GDPR, with the extensions each allows.
If we deny a request, you can appeal by replying to support@solstone.app; within 45 days we'll tell you in writing what we did or did not do about it, and why. If we deny the appeal, you can raise it with the Colorado Attorney General or the privacy regulator where you live, and nothing here stops you going to court.
If you're a Colorado resident, we honor the rights the Colorado Privacy Act describes, whether or not it applies to us; residents of California (CCPA/CPRA) and the EU/UK (GDPR) have the rights those laws give them, where they apply, including, where a law grants it, the right to restrict or object to processing. Where GDPR applies, our legal bases are these. We process your sign-in and billing data, and the records each service's section names, to perform the contract you asked for. We process what you write to us, our notes on it, the abuse and security records this page names, the checkout fingerprint named above, our working records of looking up a sign-in or a billing record, the edge logs and bot checks this page names, and the request trace, based on our legitimate interests in answering you and running and securing the service. We run the index of public vit records based on our legitimate interest in making those records browsable and searchable. You can object to either. We keep the transaction records the law obliges us to keep. We process anything else only with your consent or where the law requires it, and where we rely on your consent, you can withdraw it at any time without affecting what was done before. For anything that would leave sol pbc, the narrower rule in what sol pbc will never do applies on top of this. We do not make automated decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects about you, and do not profile you. Our covenants go further than any of these laws require.
vit and AT Protocol#
The vit project is built on AT Protocol, a decentralized protocol where most data is public by design. When you publish a capability, vouch for a skill, or follow someone on vit, that data flows across the AT Protocol network to relays and indexers operated by many different parties. Our privacy commitments apply to data on sol pbc's infrastructure; once data is published to the network, sol pbc cannot delete copies from other servers.
We run one index of public vit records, at explore.v-it.org, on Cloudflare. It copies the capabilities, vouches and skills people publish, with the identifier of the account that published each and the handle it resolves to, so they can be browsed and searched. When its author deletes a record, the index deletes it too, unless it missed the deletion. A record whose deletion it missed, the records of an account that was deleted or taken down, and every handle it has looked up stay in the index until we remove them, and we will if you ask. vit's explore and inbox commands ask this index, so using them leaves the same edge logs as visiting solpbc.org, including which project you asked about.
If sol pbc operates a relay or PDS for vit, we collect only what the protocol requires to function: no additional tracking, analytics, or data collection.
solstone and recording laws#
When what you share with the solstone app includes audio of a conversation, wiretapping and consent statutes call that recording, the term used in this section, because it is the term used in the laws.
The solstone app takes in what you share with it, including your screen and, when you turn audio recording on, the audio you record. All of it goes into your journal. If you use solstone, you are responsible for complying with recording-consent laws in your jurisdiction. Some states and countries require all parties to a conversation to consent to recording.
We don't record anything. You do, on your own hardware, and it reaches sol pbc only through a hosted service you turn on. We recommend informing others in advance when audio recording is active during conversations.
Changes to this policy#
If we change this policy, we will:
1. Update this page with a clear summary of what changed, under recent changes below
2. Add it to the changelog, which keeps earlier changes too
Before we launch any new hosted service, we publish the updated policy here. The covenants above apply to all services, and they cannot be weakened through a policy update. See the amendment lock described above.
Recent changes#
The most recent changes are here. Earlier entries are in the changelog.
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-17 | One rewrite of the whole page, to make it shorter and easier to read. Each section now says what its service keeps by kind, and a new table, how long we keep each record, puts the retention periods in one place. What the phone and watch apps reach for is described by kind. The page no longer describes how other companies' services work where that isn't ours to state, such as the push services phones use, or the hardware detail behind confidential processing. The confidential processing section no longer says the build your journal checks can't be changed without a release anyone can see; it says your journal trusts only the build pinned in solstone's open source code. Otherwise, who sees each record, how long it is kept, how it is deleted, and everything we will never do are unchanged. No processor added or removed. The binding covenants are unchanged. |
| 2026-11-16 | The changelog moved to its own page, solpbc.org/privacy/changelog. This page now shows the most recent changes, and its links to the changelog point there. Nothing else on this page changed, apart from its date. |
| 2026-11-08 | The solstone extension section now says your browser's permission decides which sites it reads. Allowing a site in your browser adds it, and if your browser allows the extension on every website, it reads every website except sites you leave out. In some browsers it also asks you to agree first. An update never widens what it reads by itself. The section no longer describes pausing Safari in the solstone app. It now says that after the solstone app is unpaired, the extension can still take in pages until it next checks with the app, and that in Safari, removing the app may leave the sites you allowed in place. Smaller corrections: we say we don't use the crash reports phones share with app developers, rather than that there are none; we honor the Colorado Privacy Act's rights whether or not it applies to us; how long a push service holds a notification is its own to say; Stripe's retention is described as Stripe's, and we say its Link option may already be selected; the sentence on sharing in the covenants section points to our processors' own uses, Stripe's among them; and that section now says that after the founder, Article 8 can only be amended to strengthen it. What the extension takes in from a page, and where it goes, don't change. No processor added or removed. The binding covenants are unchanged. |
| 2026-11-05 | The solstone extension has no welcome page on iphone and ipad. There, if your first site is one you add from the extension, it says then what it takes in, and its settings have the full description. On a computer, you still agree on its welcome page first. The section also now says that allowing a site in your browser adds it, and it no longer says the extension names the addresses a site covers each time you add one, because on iphone and ipad a later add from its popup goes straight to Safari's prompt. What the extension takes in and where it goes don't change. No processor added or removed. The binding covenants are unchanged. |
This privacy policy reflects the binding covenants in sol pbc's articles of incorporation and bylaws. The covenants are the authority: this policy describes them in plain language. If there is ever a conflict between this policy and the articles or bylaws, the articles and bylaws govern.
Questions? Get in touch.